可以推断,仇恨只有在满足两个标准的情况下才能是客观的:首先,临床医生自己并不恨病人。如果临床医生讨厌病人,他就会讨厌病人所做的事情,这不是“客观的观察”。在这种情况下,他憎恨的是那个人,而不是他的行为。第二,每一个理性的人都认为病人的行为是可恨的。如果一个人认为它是可仇恨的,而另一个人则不认为,那么仇恨就不是客观的。第一个标准是可以实现的,但在现实中,当一个医生看到一个精神病病人做许多不正常的事情时,很难对病人没有负面的感觉。第二个标准也并不总是适用的。例如,如果一个病人对着医生大喊大叫,每个人都会认为它可恨。但如果病人不服从医生的指示,有些人会讨厌这个,而有些人则不会。因此,有时告诉病人他的行为可恨是武断的。此外,医生可能不会全程观察,也不知道导致患者不良行为的因素,这可以减少他的仇恨。由于这些原因,尽管温尼科特建议医生真实地向患者传达他们的情绪可能会导致更好的沟通和合作,但它应该谨慎地使用,以避免偏见、非理性和伤害。
Winnicott’s theory renders patients accountable for analysts’ emotions, which may be problematic. Winnicott does not tell clinicians to adjust their attitudes but expects patients to change their behaviors to be lovable. For example, he had a patient who was disgusted for years but, due to therapy, became lovable one day. The patient’s disfavor was considered to be a “symptom” and his transformation to be lovable is “a tremendous advance in his adjustment to reality” (Winnicott, 1994). In this theory, a patient is judged by whether being liked by the analyst. Though others’ reactions are an important reference, but it is oversimplified that not being like means one does wrong. This may let patients care for physicians’ feelings too much and give physicians too much authority.
温尼科特的理论让病人对医生的情绪负责,这可能会有问题。温尼科特并没有告诉临床医生调整他们的态度,而是希望患者改变他们的行为变得可爱。例如,他对一个病人多年来一直感到厌恶,但由于治疗,有一天变得可爱起来。病人的不讨人喜欢被认为是一种“症状”,他变成可爱的人是“他适应现实的一个巨大进步”(温尼科特,1994)。在这个理论中,一个病人是由是否被医生喜欢来判断的。虽然其他人的反应是一个重要的参考,但它过于简化了,不被人喜欢意味着自己做错了。这可能会让病人过多地关心医生的感受,并给医生太多的权威。
Winnicott implies that it is not a duty to love someone, while it’s an individual’s responsibility to behave well in order to be lovable, and who is hated should be blamed for his bad behaviors. If a patient does not accept hate, it is because she cannot recognize that hate is generated by the very things she does (Winnicott, 1994). In this case, analysts do not initiatively love patients and patients need to seek for her love, which would make patients feel anxious and unsafe. 本章未完,请点击下一页继续阅读! 第2页/共3页
梦远书城已将原网页转码以便移动设备浏览
本站仅提供资源搜索服务,不存放任何实质内容。如有侵权内容请联系搜狗,源资源删除后本站的链接将自动失效。
推荐阅读